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Mortgage Investments and the Usury Problem
Gordon M. Harrell*
A CONTINUOUS AND STEADY EXPANSION of residential dwelling is
desirable from both a sociological and economic standpoint.
Continuing support is required from risk capital willing to invest
throughout the United States. This necessarily means that, if
funds are to be drawn from areas of financial plenty to areas ex-
periencing a financial drought, the investor will often not be a
party to the original loan transaction, but will be a transferee of
a local mortgage lender.
Real estate mortgages, which are the most frequently used
method of investing in home financing, are always subject to
the risk of waste as well as the possibility of a defaulting mort-
gagor in a declining real estate market, who will, in effect, be
judgment proof since his only asset of significance will be the
mortgaged property.
Keeping informed of the diverse usury statutes and case law
of the various states is such an onerous burden that risk capital
will be driven to other fields of investment, especially when one
considers the extreme penalties imposed in some jurisdictions,
unless some legislative relief is forthcoming. While this risk has
always been present in the real estate mortgage transaction, it
has now become a problem of more than passing interest due to
continued rising interest rates which have accompanied the gen-
eral tight money policy of the Eisenhower Administration.
We will consider those situations which are most often the
foundation for an allegation of usury by the borrower-where
there is a substantiated charge of usury against the originating
mortgagee as well as his transferee. Certain principles will also
be discussed which restrict the risk of usury to the lender and
his transferee.
The Mortgage as a Security Device
The real estate mortgage as a security device has been known
to the common law for some centuries. In 1190, Ranulph de
Glanville, a justice in eyre, described two types of land pledges.'
Historically, the mortgage has been and is a two-party trans-
action in which A, owning an estate in land, uses this interest as
a security for some risk undertaken by a second person, B. At
common law the transaction was evidenced by a complete grant
of A's legal title to B, subject, however, to a condition subsequent
whereby A could reenter and revest himself with the legal title
* B.B.A. Western Reserve University; Manager, Lake County Office, Cuya-
hoga Title & Trust Co.; Third-year student, Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 Glanville, Treatise on the Laws and Customs of England, Bk. 10, cc. 6-9
(Beames Ed. 1900).
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when he had fully performed his obligation.2 The doctrines which
have developed as to an equity of redemption3 left the legal title
of the mortgagee existing but vitiated.
A trust deed, which is also used in real estate financing, is
distinguished from a mortgage in that title is conveyed to a third
person or trustee for the benefit of both the maker and the holder
of the evidence of the indebtedness. In Illinois, case law and the
statutes treat a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage.4
The mortgage, as a security device, plays an important part
in the financing of both urban5 and rural6 land operations. Long
term credit has been a need of our economic system for cen-
turies. Few persons acquiring a home or a farm have the full
purchase price in cash.
The Background of Usury Regulation
The term usury was originally applied to the exaction of any
interest for the use of principal. Aristotle regarded it as un-
natural.7 The Old Testament forbade it as unbrotherly.8 The
common law of England and as it has been adopted and followed
in the United States has never forbidden the exaction of usury
on loans of money as a matter of general law or public policy,
irrespective of statute. At this time the question of usury is to
be considered as merely malum prohibitum, based exclusively
on statutory prohibition, and should not be considered as malum
per se. 9
2 Littleton on Tenures, Sec. 332 (Wambaugh Ed. 1903).
3 The equity of redemption had become firmly established and fully de-
fined by the time of Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 603, 26 Eng. Rep. 377 (1737).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 3, Sec. 152; c. 95, See. 23; c. 83, Sec. llb; 1 Reeves, The
Law of Mortgages and Foreclosures in Ill., c-9 (1932).
5 Since 1944 the Natl. Bureau of Economic Research has been engaged in
work on Urban Real Estate Finance. Their project has been subdivided
into (a) a basic study on "Urban Real Estate Markets: Characteristics and
Financing," prepared by Ernest M. Fisher; (b) studies of urban mortgage
lending by the four chief types of institutions, namely, large insurance
companies (R. J. Saulnier), commercial banks (Carl F. Behrens), savings
and loan associations (Edward E. Edwards), and the Home Owners' Loan
Corp. (C. Lowell Harriss); and three summary volumes dealing with the
Impact of Government on Real Estate Finance in the United States (Miles
L. Colean), Comparative Markets and Risk Experience of Mortgage Lend-
ers (J. E. Morton), and Economic Fluctuations and Urban Real Estate
Finance (Wolfgang Stolper).
6 Burkett and Parsons, Buying Farms with Hundred Percent Loans, 27
Land Economics 151 (1951).
7 Politics, i, 3.-
8 Exodus 22:25-27; Leviticus 25:35-37; Dueteronomy 23:20.
9 Missouri K. & T. Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U. S. 351, 43 L. Ed. 474, 19
Sup. Ct. 179 (1899); Lloyd v. Scott, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 205, 7 L. Ed. 833 (1830);
Matlack Properties, Inc. v. Citizens' & S. Nat. Bank, 120 Fla. 77, 162 So.
148 (1935); Thomas v. Clarkson, 125 Ga. 72, 54 S. E. 77, 6 L. R. A. (n. s.)
(Continued on next page)
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MORTGAGES AND USURY
The power of the legislature to regulate the rate of interest
received for the use of money has been recognized from an early
period in this country, although the degree of regulation has
varied markedly.
Usury statutes are held to be valid police regulation for the
protection of heedless borrowers whose necessities, real or
imagined, frequently place them at the mercy of the lender.10
The legislature has very broad powers in the regulation of usury,
and statutes establishing maximum rates of interest will generally
be upheld as not being in violation of the prohibition against
class legislation. 1
Definition and Determination of Usury
The definition of usury imports the existence of certain es-
sential elements generally stated to be (1) a loan or forbearance,
either express or implied, of money or of something circulating
as such; (2) an understanding between the parties that the
principal shall be repayable absolutely; (3) the exaction of a
greater profit than is allowed by law; and (4) an intention to
violate the law. 12 The presence of these elements infallibly in-
dicates usury irrespective of the form in which the parties dis-
guise the transaction; on the other hand, the absence of any one
of them conclusively refutes the claim of usurious practice.13
In order that a transaction be deemed usurious these elements
(Continued from preceding page)
658 (1906); Jones v. Nossman, 114 Kan. 886, 221 Pac. 271, 37 A. L. R. 317
(1923); Gehlert v. Smiley (Mo.) 114 S. W. 2d 1029 (1937); Houghton v.
Page, 2 N. H. 42 (1819), 9 Am. Dec. 30; Lee v. Hillman, 74 Wash. 408, 133
Pac. 583 (1913), L. R. A. 1918B 581, Ann. Cas. 1915A 759; Hamilton v.
Prouty, 50 Wis. 592, 7 N. W. 659 (1880), 36 Am. Rep. 866.
10 State ex rel. Ornstein v. Cary, 126 Wis. 135, 105 N. W. 792 (1905), 11
L. R. A. (n. s.) 174, writ of error dism. 204 U. S. 669, 51 L. Ed. 672, 27 Sup.
Ct. 788 (1907).
11 Youngblood v. Birmingham Trust & Say. Co., 95 Ala. 521, 12 So. 579
(1892), 20 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245; Re Stephan, 170 Cal. 48, 148 Pac.
196 (1915); Ann. Cas. 1916E 617; Straus v. Elless Co., 245 Mich. 558, 222
N. W. 752 (1929); Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43 (1916),
L. R. A. 1917D 641, Ann. Cas. 1918B 402.
12 Jenkins v. Dugger, 96 F. 2d 727, 119 A. L. R. 1484 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938),
cert. den. 305 U. S. 623, 83 L. Ed. 398, 59 Sup. Ct. 84 (1938); Seebold v.
Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N. W. 2d 739, 152 A. L. R. 585 (1944);
Planters' Nat. Bank of Virginia v. Wysong & Miles Co., 177 N. C. 380, 99
S. E. 199, 12 A. L. R. 1412 (1919), cert. den. 250 U. S. 665, 63 L. Ed. 1197,
40 Sup. Ct. 13 (1919), writ of error dism. 251 U. S. 568, 64 L. Ed. 418, 40
Sup. Ct. 343 (1919); Coast Finance Corp. v. Powers Furniture Co., 105 Ore.
339, 209 Pac. 614, 24 A. L. R. 855 (1922); Beach v. Guaranty Say. & L. Ass'n.,
44 Ore. 530, 76 Pac. 16 (1904), 1 Ann. Cas. 408.
13 Lloyd v. Scott, supra note 9; MacRackan v. Bank of Columbus, 164 N. C.
24, 80 S. E. 184 (1913), 49 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1043, Ann. Cas. 1915D 105; Beach
v. Guaranty Say. & L. Ass'n., supra note 12; Bexar Bldg. & L. Ass'n. v.
Robinson, 78 Tex. 163, 14 S. W. 227 (1890), 9 L. R. A. 292, 22 Am. St. Rep.
36.
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must exist at the inception of the contract, 14 since a contract
which in its inception is unaffected by usury can never be in-
validated by any subsequent usurious transaction. It is the agree-
ment to exact and pay usurious interest, and not the perform-
ance of the agreement, which renders it usurious. 15 The test to
be applied in any given case is whether the contract, if performed
according to the terms, would produce a rate of interest for the
lender in excess of the amount allowed by law, and whether
the parties intended such a result.1
The courts generally feel that the ingenuity of lenders and
eagerness of borrowers to accede to any demand made by the
lenders in order to obtain momentary relief from financial strain
have resulted in a variety of devices to avoid the usury regula-
tions. As a consequence, the courts will generally look to the
substance of the transaction and disregard its form when the
elements of usury appear to be present.17 The cases are not de-
cided by what the parties appear to be representing themselves
as, but rather by what the transaction actually is as disclosed by
a consideration of the entire evidence."'
The Effect of Usury
A transaction intended to create a mortgage may not reach
its objective, either wholly or in part, because the mortgagee had
insisted upon receiving more interest than permitted by statute.
The statutes vary in their provisions as to the effects which re-
sult when a loan is held to be usurious. One group of statutes im-
poses only a forfeiture of the excess interest or imposes a speci-
14 Nichols v. Fearson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 103, 8 L. Ed. 623 (1833); Lloyd v.
Scott, supra note 9; Gaither v. Farmers' & M. Bank, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 37, 7
L. Ed. 43 (1828); Sharp v. Mortgage Secur. Corp., 215 Cal. 287, 9 P. 2d
819 (1932); State v. Bankers Finance Corp., 26 A. 2d 220 (Del., 1942); Unity
Plan Finance Co., Inc. v. Green, 179 La. 1070, 155 So. 900 (1934); Ayer v.
Tilden, 15 Gray (Mass.) 178, 77 Am. Dec. 355 (1860); Richardson v. Camp-
bell, 34 Neb. 181, 51 N. W. 753 (1892), 33 Am. St. Rep. 633, overruled on
another point in Havemeyer v. Paul, 45 Neb. 373, 389, 63 N. W. 932 (1895),
and Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Westerhoff, 58 Neb. 379, 383, 78 N. W.
724 (1899), 79 N. W. 731, 76 Am. St. Rep. 101; Armijo v. Henry, 14 N. M.
181, 89 Pac. 305 (1907), 25 L. R. A. (n. s.) 275; Southall v. Farish, 85 Va.
403, 7 S. E. 534 (1888), 1 L. R. A. 641; Ward v. Cornett, 91 Va. 676, 22 S. E.
494 (1895), 49 L. R. A. 550; Cissna Loan Co. v. Gawley, 87 Wash. 438, 151
P. 792 (1915), L. R. A. 1916B 807, Ann. Cas. 1917D 722; Heaberlin v. Jeffer-
son Stand. L. Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 198, 171 S. E. 419 (1933).
15 Seebold v. Eustermann, supra note 12; Southall v. Farish, supra note 14.
16 Seebold v. Eustermann, supra note 12.
17 Houghton v. Burden, 228 U. S. 161, 57 L. Ed. 780, 33 Sup. Ct. 491 (1913);
Omaha Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U. S. 13, 24 L. Ed. 917 (1877); Andrews v.
Pond, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 65, 10 L. Ed. 61 (1839).
18 McBroom v. Scottish Mortg. & Land Invest. Co., 153 U. S. 318, 38 L. Ed.
729, 14 Sup. Ct. 852 (1894); Omaha Hotel Co. v. Wade, supra note 17; Scott v.
Lloyd, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 418, 9 L. Ed. 178 (1835); Bank of United States v.
Waggener, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 378, 9 L. Ed. 163 (1835); Bank of United States v.
Owens, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 527, 7 L. Ed. 508 (1829).
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fled penalty. Under this type of statute the mortgagor may
secure a cancellation of the recorded mortgage by paying the
debt with only the lawful interest,19 and the mortgagee may
foreclose, but only for the debt plus lawful interest.20 A second
group is more drastic-the transaction is completely invalidated,
permitting the mortgagor to have the recorded mortgage cancel-
led without any payment whatsoever1 and completely barring
the mortgagee from foreclosure.22
A synopsis of the usury statutes of the various states is ap-
pended at the end of this article.
National banks are governed as to interest rates by a com-
bination of federal and state statutes, and as to the penalties for
usury by the federal regulations alone. The National Bank Act 23
provides, in essence, that a national bank may not charge or re-
ceive interest on a loan or discount at a greater rate than that
allowed by the laws of the state, territory, or district in which
the bank is located, or at a rate based on (and one per cent in
excess thereof) of the rate in effect in the Federal Reserve Bank
in the Federal Reserve District where the national bank is located,
whichever of the two rates may be greater, except that if a dif-
ferent rate is limited for banks organized under state laws, the
rate so limited shall be allowed to national banks organized or
existing in such state.2 4
The penalties for non-compliance with the state usury laws
by national banks are provided by federal regulations, to wit:
forfeiture of the entire interest which the evidence of the debt
carried with it or which has been paid, and liability for an action
for double the amount of the interest paid.2 5
19 Heacock v. Swartwout, 28 Ill. 291 (1862); Walter v. Calhoun, 88 Kan.
801 (1913); Levenson v. Cohen, 250 Mich. 31, 229 N. W. 433 (1930).
20 Poulk v. Cairo Bkg. Co., 158 Ga. 338, 123 S. E. 292 (1924); Harbison v.
Houghton, 41 Ill. 522 (1866); Boynton v. Remsen, 133 Md. 101, 104 Atl. 527(1918); Pond v. Causdell, 23 N. J. Eq. 181 (1872); Rogers v. Booker, 184
N. C. 183, 113 S. E. 671 (1922); Gunness v. Stever, 60 Okla. 24, 158 Pac. 568(1916); Ward v. Sharp, 15 Vt. 115 (1843).
21 N. Y. Stat. (McKinney, 1950) Gen. Bus. Law sec. 377, expressly forbid-
ding any judicial requirement of payment as condition of clearing the
record title. Applying this statute, Jaen v. Greater Co. Realty Corp., 83
N. Y. S. 2d 360 (1948).
22 Munter & Faber v. Linn, 61 Ala. 492 (1878); Mitchell v. Preston, 5 Day
(Conn.) 100 (1811); Drury v. Morse, 85 Mass. 445 (1862); Genl. Motors
Accept. Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S. W. 425 (1924); Lasko-
witz v. Getzowitz, 211 App. Div. 239, 207 S. 355 (1925); Weaver Hard. Co. v.
Solomovitz, 235 N. Y. 321, 139 N. E. 353 (1923); Casner v. Hoskins, 64 Ore.
254, 130 Pac. 55 (1912); Heath v. Page, 48 Pa. 130 (1864); Robertson v.
Campbell, 2 Call (Va.) 421 (1800); Fay v. Lovejoy, 20 Wis. 428 (1866).
23 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 21, et seq.
24 12 U. S. C. A. Sec. 85.
25 In First Nat. Bank v. Childs, 130 Mass. 519, 39 Am. Rep. 474 (1881), it
was pointed out that the rate of interest which a national bank in any
(Continued on next page)
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Where the Risk of Usury Lies
It is obvious that usury will lie where the rate of interest
shown on the face of the note exceeds the statutory maximum.
Therefore, this article will consider those matters that are not
quite so apparent.
The charges with which the mortgage lender must concern
himself are what is known in the trade as finders or placement
fees and closing costs, covered below under the title of commis-
sions and expenses respectively. It should be borne in mind,
however, that usury will only lie where the total of these charges
plus the interest set forth in the mortgage note exceed the legal
maximum.
The reasonableness of the charges as to amount against the
borrower seems to be given considerable weight in determining
their character as usurious or not. Many cases refer to the un-
reasonableness of such charges as a ground for considering them
illegal. 26
1. Commissions
While the courts generally hold that the payment of a com-
mission to one acting as agent for the borrower in negotiating
a loan will not render the loan usurious, they hold different
views as to the effect on the loan when the borrower's agent
shares his commission with the lender. Most courts hold that if
a part of the commission is paid to the lender as an inducement
to grant the loan, the transaction will be deemed usurious.
Usually when the lender takes a share in the commission
paid to the borrower's agent as a part of the consideration for the
loan, it will be considered to be a device to obtain more than the
legal rate of interest, and consequently will make the loan
usurious.2 7 There have been some cases, however, where loans
have been held not to be usurious, even though it appeared that
the division of the broker's commission with the lender was
exacted as a condition of granting the loan, on the theory, that
the borrower had already agreed to pay the commission to his
(Continued from preceding page)
state may take is determined and fixed by the federal statute, although it
is measured in such state by reference to the local law concerning interest,
if there is one; and that when a bank takes interest in excess of the legal
rate, it violates a federal law, and not the law of the state, the consequences
being those provided by federal law and not those provided by state law.
26 Sherwood v. Roundtree (CC Ga.), 32 Fed. 113 (1887); Douglass v.
Boulevard Co., 91 Conn. 601, 100 Atl. 1067 (1917); Avery v. Creigh, 35
Minn. 456, 29 N. W. 154 (1886).
27 Fisher v. Porter, 23 Fed. 162 (1885) (recognizing rule) (CC Neb.), Jones
v. Phillippe, 135 Ark. 578, 206 S. W. 40 (1918); O'Neil v. Cleveland, 30 N. J.
Eq. 273 (1878).
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agent, and therefore was not paying any more simply because
the agent divided the commission with the lender.28
A division of the commission of the borrower's agent with
the agent of the lender will not charge the lender with usury
when he does not have knowledge of the division and does not
authorize or benefit from it.
29
The majority rule is that a loan is not made usurious if the
lender's agent charged the borrower a commission or bonus in
excess of the maximum legal rate of interest for procuring the
loan, when the charge was made for the agent's own benefit, was
made without the knowledge of the lender or his consent either
express or implied, and was not ratified or shared in by the
lender.30
When an agency is general, it has been decided in several
cases that the lender will be affected by the exactions of the
agent even though made without the actual knowledge or au-
thority of the lender and even in some cases contrary to his
express instructions.3 1
It is generally held that the exaction of a commission from
the borrower by the lender's agent will render the transaction
usurious if such exaction is known to, or authorized by, the
lender.32
Authority of a nature to make the lender responsible for
usury has frequently been inferred from the fact that there
was either an express or implied understanding between the
lender and his agent that the latter would get his compensation
from the borrower. 33 The understanding that the lender's agent
will be remunerated by the borrower has often been adduced
from the fact that the lender avails himself of the agent's services
without paying him anything. 34
28 Jones v. Phillippe, supra note 27; Pushee v. Johnson, 123 Fla. 305, 166
So. 847, 105 A. L. R. 789 (1936); Patterson v. Blomberg, 196 N. C. 433, 146
S. E. 66 (1929).
29 Dickey v. Brown, 56 Iowa 426, 9 N. W. 347 (1881); Union Cent. L. Ins.
Co. v. Edwards, 219 Ky. 748, 294 S. W. 502 (1927); Acheson v. Chase, 28
Minn. 211, 9 N. W. 734 (1881).
30 Call v. Palmer, 116 U. S. 98, 29 L. Ed. 559, 6 Sup. St. 301 (1885); Ginn v.
New England Mortg. Secur. Co., 92 Ala. 135, 8 So. 388 (1890); Condit v.
Baldwin, 21 N. Y. 219, 78 Am. Dec. 137 (1860), affg. 21 Barb. 181.
3' Matzenbaugh v. Troup, 36 Ill. App. 261 (1889); Avery v. Creigh, supra
note 26; Ridgway v. Davenport, 37 Wash. 134, 79 Pac. 606 (1905).
32 Eddy v. Badger, 8 Biss 238, Fed. Cas. No. 4276 (CC fll. 1878); Vahlberg
v. Keaton, 51 Ark. 534, 11 S. W. 878 (1889), 4 L. R. A. 462, 14 Am. St. Rep.
73; Rose v. Baxter, 67 Ohio App. 1, 21 Ohio Ops. 41, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 546,
34 N. E. 2d 1011 (1941).
33 Clarke v. Havard, 111 Ga. 242, 36 S. E. 837 (1900), 51 L. R. A. 499; Freed-
man v. Katz, 246 Mich. 296, 224 N. W. 325 (1929); Brown v. Johnson, 43
Utah 1, 134 Pac. 590 (1913), 46 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1157, Ann. Cas. 1916C 321
(recognizing rule).
34 Vahlberg v. Keaton, supra note 32; France v. Munro, 138 Iowa 1, 115
N. W. 577 (1908), 19 L. R. A. (n. s.) 391; Western Storage & Warehouse Co.
v. Glasner, 169 Mo. 38, 68 S. W. 917 (1902).
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When a bonus or any part thereof which was taken by the
lender's agent was exacted directly for the benefit of the lender,
and he accepts it knowingly, he thereby becomes chargeable
with usury.35
The requirement that the borrower pay a commission to the
intermediary, through whom the loan was actually or apparently
negotiated, will be held to constitute usury when the court can
determine that the payment in excess of lawful interest was
really exacted as a consideration for the loan, and not as a fee
for the services of the agent to the borrower. 36 If the actual
lender, in attempting to evade the usury statute, pretends to act
as agent or broker, and takes a commission for his alleged serv-
ice in negotiating the loan from a third party, the court will de-
clare the transaction to be usurious. 37
Commissions paid to an agent have also been held to render
a loan usurious when the borrower was required or induced to go
through the form of employing an agent, who was in fact acting
for the lender; or even to execute an instrument in connection
with the loan, containing a statement that the intermediary,
through whom it was negotiated, was the borrower's agent.38
Also held to be usurious are transactions by which one member
of a family takes a commission for alleged services in negotiating
loans from another member of the same family, when such ar-
rangements appear to be a disguise for excessive compensation
for the loan.39
2. Expenses
The majority view is that payment by the borrower of rea-
sonable expenses incidental to the loan and of reasonable com-
pensation for trouble and service involved in or necessitated by
it, when done in good faith and not as consideration for the loan,
is not usury even though the expenses may make the cost of the
transaction to the borrower exceed the highest legal interest
rate.40
35 Jones v. Phillippe, supra note 27; Rogers v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 81
(1865); Scottish Mortg. & Land Invest. Co. v. McBroom, 6 N. M. 573, 30
Pac. 859 (1892), affd. 153 U. S. 318, 38 L. Ed. 729, 14 Sup. Ct. 852.
36 Tompkins v. Vaught, 138 Ark. 262, 211 S. W. 361 (1919); Fitzgerald v.
Maupin, 5 Ky. L. R. 242 (abstract, 12 Ky. Ops. 246) (1883); Adelson v.
B. F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 80 S. W. 2d 939 (1935).
87 Commercial Secur. Co. v. Holcombe (C. A. 5th Ala.), 262 Fed. 657
(1920); Gardner v. Ruffner, 206 Ala. 666, 91 So. 580 (1921); Robertson v.
Merwin, 154 App. Div. 723, 139 N. Y. S. 726 (1913).
38 Sherwood v. Roundtree, supra note 26; State ex rel. Fatzer v. Miller, 177
Kan. 324, 279 P. 2d 223, 52 A. L. R. 2d 691 (1955); Olmsted v. New England
Mortg. Secur. Co., 11 Neb. 487, 9 N. W. 650 (1881).
39 Armstrong v. McCluskey, 188 Ark. 406, 65 S. W. 2d 558 (1933); Braine
v. Rosswog, 13 App. Div. 249, 42 N. Y. S. 1098 (1897), app. dismd. 153 N. Y.
647, 47 N. E. 1105; Dayton v. Dearholt, 85 Wis. 151, 55 N. W. 147 (1893).
40 Lassman v. Jacobson, 125 Minn. 218, 51 L. R. A. (n. s.) 465, 146 N. W.
350 (1914), Ann. Cas. 1915C, 774; Iowa Sav. & L. Ass'n. v. Heidt, 107 Iowa
(Continued on next page)
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Generally held not to render a loan usurious are the actual
and reasonable expenses of preparing abstracts and of investigat-
ing and passing upon the title of the borrower to the property
which will be mortgaged to secure the loan. 1 The actual and
reasonable expenses to perfect the title of the borrower to the
property offered as security for the loan and for removal of prior
encumbrances can be charged against the borrower without ren-
dering the loan usurious.42 The requirement that the borrower
shall pay the actual and reasonable cost of drawing or acknowl-
edging or recording the papers connected with the loan will not
constitute usury.4 3
The cases are not in accord as to whether attorney's fees
or other expenses resulting from efforts to collect or settle an
indebtedness may be included in a note given to secure additional
time for payment without thereby causing it to be usurious.
44
3. Interest in Advance
The problem area is the taking of interest before the expira-
tion of the proportionate part of the entire period of the loan that
represents the amount of the interest taken, assuming the interest
to be computed at the maximum legal rate. The essence of the
matter is that interest has been paid or promised for a future
period as to which the borrower has not yet had the benefit of
the principal.
The taking of interest at the highest lawful rate annually in
advance has been held usurious. These decisions appear to have
been based on strict a priori logic in applying the usury regula-
tions.45 The courts have upheld semi-annual advance interest
payments, sometimes commenting that there is no objection to
the taking of interest in advance.4 6 The "net principal loaned"
(Continued from preceding page)
297, 43 L. R. A. 689, 70 Am. St. Rep. 197, 77 N. W. 1050 (1899); Robertson
Bkg. Co. v. Chamberlain, 143 C. C. A. 82, 228 Fed. 500 (1916), reversing Re
Elmore Cotton Mills, 217 Fed. 810 (1914).
41 Amondson v. Ryan, 111 Ill. 506 (1885); London Realty Co. v. Riordan,
207 N. Y. 264 (1913), 100 N. E. 800, Ann. Cas. 1914C 408, affirming 148 App.
Div. 854, 133 N. Y. Supp. 595 (1912); Testera v. Richardson, 77 Wash. 377,
137 Pac. 998 (1914).
42 Ballinger v. Bourland, 87 Ill. 513, 29 Am. Rep. 69 (1889); Testera v.
Richardson, supra note 41; Rozier v. Evans, 113 Ga. 1162, 39 S. E. 481
(1901).
43 Baird v. Millwood, 51 Ark. 548, 11 S. W. 881 (1889); Rozier v. Evans,
supra note 42; London Realty Co. v. Riordan, supra note 41.
44 Kent v. Phelps, 2 Day (Conn.) 483 (1807); Harger v. McCullough, 2
Denio (N. Y.) 119 (1846); Toole v. Stephen, 4 Leigh (Va.) 581 (1833);
Whitworth v. Davey, 279 Mo. 672, 216 S. W. 736 (1919), approving as to
this point 185 S. W. 241 (Mo. App. 1916).
45 Penn Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 40 Ohio St. 260 (1883); Polkinghorne
v. Hendricks, 61 Miss. 366 (1883).
46 Hoyt v. Pawtucket Institution for Say., 110 Ill. 390 (1884); Stark v.
Coffin, 105 Mass. 328 (1870); Roller v. Hamilton, 13 Tenn. App. 241 (1931).
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formula has caused loans to be tainted with usury where the
interest was taken quarterly in advance. 47 But the taking of
interest monthly in advance will not generally render a loan
usurious.48
When the lender has so delayed the delivery of the principal
loaned that the period of actual enjoyment of the loan by the
borrower is so abbreviated as to no longer support the interest
taken as being within the statute, then usury will lie.
49
Usury will not result, however, if the paying or taking of
interest in advance is done voluntarily, on the part of the bor-
rower, by way of personal convenience and not as a matter of
contractual compulsion. 50
Principles Restricting the Risk of Usury to the Lender
1. Special Statutes covering Building and Loan Associations
A number of courts have adopted a view of the relation
between a building and loan association and a borrowing member,
which is analogous to the partnership theory: that the relation-
ship consists of two distinct and separate contracts, the one of
membership and the other of the loan.5 1 In several jurisdictions
it is held that the loan contract of a building association is in the
nature of a sale of a member's stock to the association, or more
strictly, an advance by the association in anticipation of the
maturity of the borrower's stock, 52 and that the sum advanced
is not the debt or part thereof, but that the obligation of the
member receiving it is to make the payments agreed upon until
the unredeemed shares attain their face value.
The other view is that the transaction is simply a loan of
money.5 3
47 Purvis v. Frink, 57 Fla. 519, 49 So. 1023 (1909); cf., Johnson v. Groce,
175 S. C. 312, 179 S. E. 39 (1935).
48 Pope v. North Texas Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 87 S. W. 2d 494 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1935); Geisberg v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 60 S. W. 478 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1900); cf., Taylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 18 P. 2d 333 (1933).
49 Smith v. Parsons, 55 Minn. 520, 57 N. W. 311 (1893); Mindlin v. Davis,
74 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1954).
50 Van Beil v. Fordney, 79 Ala. 76 (1885).
51 Bell v. Southern Home Bldg. & L. Ass'n., 140 Ala. 371, 37 So. 237 (1904),
103 Am. St. Rep. 41; Reeve v. Ladies Bldg. Ass'n., 56 Ark. 335, 19 S. W. 917
(1892), 18 L. R. A. 129.
52 Butson v. Home Sav. & T. Co., 129 Iowa 370, 105 N. W. 645 (1906), 4
L. R. A. (n. s.) 98, 113 Am. St. Rep. 463; Bertche v. Equitable Loan & In-
vest. Ass'n., 147 Mo. 343, 48 S. W. 954 (1898), 71 Am. St. Rep. 571; Wash-
ington Nat. Bldg. Loan & Invest. Ass'n. v. Stanley, 38 Ore. 319, 63 Pac. 489
(1901), 58 L. R. A. 816, 84 Am. St. Rep. 793; Crabtree v. Old Dominion
Bldg. & L. Ass'n., 95 Va. 670, 29 S. E. 741, 64 Am. St. Rep. 818 (1898).
53 Lindsay v. United States Say. & L. Co., 120 Ala. 156, 24 So. 171 (1898),
42 L. R. A. 783; Falls v. United States Say. L. & Bldg. Co., 97 Ala. 417, 13
So. 25 (1892), 24 L. R. A. 174, 38 Am. St. Rep. 194; Bank of Newport v.
Cook, 60 Ark. 288 (1895), 30 S. W. 35, 29 L. R. A. 761, 46 Am. St. Rep. 171.
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The majority of the courts hold that contracts of building and
loan associations with their members, for a loan at a legal rate
of interest, are not rendered usurious by the fact that the pre-
miums, dues and fines exacted bring the total payment by the
borrower to an amount exceeding the lawful interest on the
loan.
5 4
In many states special statutes have been enacted exempt-
ing building and loan associations from the operation of the gen-
eral usury statutes.5 5 A large majority of the courts have upheld
the constitutionality of these exemptions,5 6 on the basis that the
plan of business adopted and the mutual participation in the
profits arising from it make the associations so distinct a class as
to justify special or distinctive legislation.5 7
Allegations of usury in connection with loans made by build-
ing and loan associations are usually based upon the premiums
which the borrowers are required to pay in addition to legal
interest. This allegation will not lie in those jurisdictions where
the transaction is not regarded as a loan, but as a sale of the
borrower's future interest in his stock, and the premium is
considered to be a discount for payment in advance. Usury will
not lie where, by a valid statute, associations are permitted to
take premiums from borrowers and the taking of the premium
conforms to the statutory terms.5 s The taking of premiums will,
however, constitute usury where the taking did not conform to
the statutory provisions therefor.5 9 Thus, when a statute states
that the premium is to be determined by open competitive bid-
ding or in some other designated manner, a premium not thus
taken taints the loan with usury when the premium and the
interest combined exceed the statutory maximum.60
2. Corporations-Denial of the Defense of Usury
A statute denying a corporation the defense of usury was
first enacted in New York in 1850, following the decision in Dry
54 West Winsted Sav. Bank & Bldg. Ass'n. v. Ford, 27 Conn. 282, 71 Am.
Dec. 66 (1858); Delano v. Wild, 6 Allen (Mass.) 1, 83 Am. Dec. 605 (1863);
Hickman v. Oklahoma Sav. & L. Ass'n., 169 Okla. 224, 36 P. 2d 928 (1934);
Collings v. Industrial Say. Soc., 94 Okla. 271, 221 Pac. 1036 (1923); Harper
v. Middle States Loan, Bldg. & Constr. Co., 55 W. Va. 149, 46 S. E. 817
(1904), 2 Ann. Cas. 42.
55 Anna Loan & Improvement Co. v. Dorris, 342 Ill. 567, 174 N. E. 865
(1931); Iowa Say. & L. Ass'n. v. Heidt, supra note 40; Preston v. Rockey,
185 N. Y. 186, 77 N. E. 1156 (1906).
56 Cramer v. Southern Ohio Loan & T. Co., 72 Ohio St. 395, 74 N. E. 200
(1905), 69 L. R. A. 415, 2 Ann. Cas. 990.
57 Spithover v. Jefferson Bldg. & L. Ass'n., 225 Mo. 660, 125 S. W. 766
(1909), 26 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1135, 20 Ann. Cas. 1248.
58 Washington Nat. Bldg. Loan & Invest. Ass'n. v. Stanley, supra note 52.
59 Falls v. United States Sav. Loan & Bldg. Co., supra note 53.
60 Anna Loan & Improvement Co. v. Dorris, supra note 55.
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Dock Bank v. American Life Insurance & Trust Co.,"' whereby
a New York banking corporation had succeeded in having its
corporate obligations of $250,000 declared void on the ground that
they had been given in payment for usurious loans to the bank.
This complete avoidance of liability made apparent the necessity
of legislation to prevent the recurrence of such a result. A num-
ber of other states have since followed New York's lead, and have
enacted similar legislation. This data is included in the table at
the end of this note.
These statutes, depriving corporations of the right to the
defense of usury in any action, have generally been held con-
stitutional. 62
In several cases it has been decided that statutes providing
that corporations shall not interpose the defense of usury in any
action are retrospective in operation, and apply to obligations
incurred by corporations prior to the effective date of such legis-
lation.6 3
Statutes which deny a corporation the right to interpose the
defense of usury have generally been held to preclude a receiver
of a corporation from interposing such defense.6 4 Creditors are
also generally precluded from the defense when the debtor cor-
poration is itself under such a prohibition.6 5 A few cases hold
that, even though the corporation is denied the defense of usury,
an individual who is a co-maker with a corporation on a usurious
instrument may interpose the defense of usury.6 6
3. Special F. H. A. Statute
The F. H. A. has sponsored a statute, whereby locally char-
tered banks and sometimes locally chartered building and loan
associations and insurance companies are authorized to invest in
F. H. A. loans without being subject to the state usury statutes
as well as certain other regulatory statutes. To the best of my
knowledge, there is not yet any developed case law construing
this statute, which has been enacted by about twenty-seven
states. A typical enaction of this law will be found in New York
Unconsolidated Laws, Ch. 13, Sec. 1.
61 Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & T. Co., 3 N. Y. 344 (1850).
62 WM. S. & John H. Thomas, Inc., v. Union Trust Co., 251 Mich. 279, 231
N. W. 619 (1930); Carozza v. Federal Finance & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223,
131 AtI. 332, 43 A. L. R. 1 (1925).
68 Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9 (1857).
64 Manufacturers' Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U. S. 442, 79 L. Ed. 982, 55
Sup. Ct. 444 (1935), revg. 72 F. 2d 471 (CA 7 Ill.) (Illinois Statute); Felin
v. Arrow Motor Mach. Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 44, 124 Atl. 448 (1924); Curtis v.
Leavitt, supra note 63.
65 In The Vigilancia, 73 Fed. 452 (C. A. 2 N. Y.), affg. 68 Fed. 781 (D. C.
1896).
66 Cabrera v. Olsen, 165 Misc. 374, 300 N. Y. S. 524 (1937).
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The effect of this is that locally chartered lending institutions
can make an F. H. A. loan, which would otherwise be rendered
usurious, whereas a local non-banking institution, federal savings
and loan association, or foreign lender would be prohibited or
subject to the penalty of the usury laws.
It is possible that a national bank could also make such loans
under the protection of this statute, on the theory that a national
bank may charge a higher rate of interest than that permitted
under the national bank act, in those states where the statutory
maximum for state chartered commercial banks is higher than
the maximum set forth under the national bank act (12 USCA
85).
4. Negotiable Instruments Law Theory
The preceding principles, which restrict the impact of the
usury laws, apply to the original parties to the transaction as
well as to a transferee of the parties. The NIL theory, absent
any of the preceding protection, will afford protection only to a
transferee of the mortgagee.
A mortgage alone will not ordinarily be considered negoti-
able;6 7 however, when it has been given to secure a negotiable
instrument and when the two documents are negotiated together,
the mortgage will, in most jurisdictions, acquire some qualities of
negotiability.' s
The rule said to be followed by the majority of the courts is
that when a mortgage and note have been negotiated to a holder
in due course, the mortgage shares the same immunity from de-
fenses as the note which is secured thereby. To have this status,
the note must have been negotiated in such a manner as to free
it from all equities existing in favor of the maker of the note,
prior indorsers, or third parties.69
This rule has been developed as follows: The mortgage is
simply a security for the debt which is evidenced by the note.
To exist, a mortgage must secure a debt.70 Thus, since the
67 Sanford v. Kane, 133 Ill. 199, 24 N. E. 414 (1890), 8 L. R. A. 724; Union
Dime Say. Inst. v. Wilmot, 94 N. Y. 221 (1883), 46 Am. Rep. 137; Weyh v.
Boylan, 85 N. Y. 394 (1881), 39 Am. Rep. 669; Marling v. Fitzgerald, 138
Wis. 93, 120 N. W. 388 (1909), 23 L. R. A. (n. s.) 177, 131 Am. St. Rep.
1003.
68 Foster v. Augustanna College & Theological Seminary, 92 Okla. 96,
218 Pac. 335, 37 A. L. R. 854 (1923); Lewis v. Kirk, 28 Kan. 497, 42 Am.
Rep. 173 (1882); See also Jemisan v. Howell, 230 Ala. 423, 161 So. 806, 99
A. L. R. 1511 (1935).
69 Chicago R. Equipment Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 136 U. S. 268, 34
L. Ed. 349 (1890); Jemison v. Howell, supra note 68; Des Moines Sav. Bank
v. Arthur, 163 Iowa 205, 143 N. W. 556 (1913), Ann. Cas. 1916C 498; Murphy
v. Barnard, 162 Mass. 72, 38 N. E. 29 (1894), 44 Am. St. Rep. 340.
70 Walsh, Mortgages, Sec. 61 (1934) ("an assignment of the mortgage with-
out the debt is a nullity in lien states and in title theory states the equi-
(Continued on next page)
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mortgage is incidental to the note or debt, the negotiability of the
note is imputed to the mortgage, therefore only those defenses
which could be raised against the note can be raised against the
mortgage.
This rule, said to be followed by the majority of states,7 1
seems to be very narrow, if, in fact, it is actually followed.
(Continued from preceding page)
table or actual right to the security remains with the debt in spite of the
assignment"); 2 Jones, Mortgages, Sec. 1019 (8th ed. 1928); Glenn, Mort-
gages, Sec. 314 (1943); 5 Tiffany, Real Property, Sec. 1448 (3rd ed. Jones
1939).
71 Alabama: Hart v. Adler, 109 Ala. 467, 19 So. 894 (1896); Jackson v.
Johnson, 189 Ala. 227, 66 So. 623 (1914); Royal Tire Service v. Shades Val-
ley Boys' Club, 232 Ala. 357, 168 So. 139 (1936).
Arizona: Stock Growers Finance Corp. v. Hildreth, 30 Ariz. 505, 249 Pac.
71 (1926).
California: Hayward Lumber & Invest. Co. v. Naslund, 125 Cal. App. 34, 13
P. 2d 775 (1932).
Colorado: Frost v. Fisher, 13 Colo. App. 322, 58 Pac. 872 (1899); Cowing v.
Cloud, 16 Colo. App. 326, 65 Pac. 417 (1901).
Florida: Taylor v. American Nat. Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678 (1912), Ann.
Cas. 1914A 309; McClure v. American Nat. Bank, 67 Fla. 32, 64 So. 427
(1914); Pensacola State Bank v. McClure, 67 Fla. 289, 64 So. 1022 (1914).
Indiana: Gabbert v. Schwartz, 69 Ind. 450 (1880); Reeves v. Hayes, 95 Ind.
521 (1884).
Iowa: Clasey v. Sigg, 51 Iowa 371, 1 N. W. 590 (1879); Des Moines Say.
Bank v. Arthur, 163 Iowa 205, 143 N. W. 556 (1913), Ann. Cas. 1916C 498;
Bank of Wayland v. Staidley, 185 Iowa 1286, 172 N. W. 9 (1919).
Kansas: Coverse v. Bartels, 46 Pac. 940 (Kan. 1896); Berry v. Berry, 57
Kan. 691, 47 Pac. 837 (1897), 57 Am. St. Rep. 351.
Kentucky: Duncan v. Louisville, 13 Bush 378, 26 Am. Rep. 201 (1877).
Maine: Sprague v. Graham, 29 Me. 160 (1848).
Massachusetts: Watson v. Wyman, 161 Mass. 96, 36 N. E. 692 (1894);
Murphy v. Barnard, supra note 69; Bon v. Graves, 216 Mass. 440, 103 N. E.
1023 (1914); Paika v. Perry, 225 Mass. 563, 114 N. E. 830 (1917).
Michigan: Barnum v. Phenix, 60 Mich. 388, 27 N. W. 577 (1886); Williams
v. Keyes, 90 Mich. 290, 51 N. W. 520 (1892), 30 Am. St. Rep. 438; Costigan
v. Howard, 100 Mich. 335, 58 N. W. 1116 (1894).
Missouri: Logan v. Smith, 62 Mo. 455 (1876); Goodfellow v. Stillwell, 73
Mo. 17 (1880); Hagerman v. Sutton, 91 Mo. 519, 4 S. W. 73 (1887).
Nebraska: Wortendyke v. Meehan, 9 Neb. 221, 2 N. W. 339 (1879); Cheney
v. Cooper, 14 Neb. 415, 16 N. W. 471 (1883); Doll v. Hollenbeck, 19 Neb.
639, 28 N. W. 286 (1886); Cheney v. Janssen, 20 Neb. 128, 29 N. W. 289
(1886).
New Hampshire: Paige v. Chapman, 58 N. H. 333 (1878).
New York: Gould v. Marsh, 1 Hun. 566 (1874); Weaver Hardware Co. v.
Solomovitz, 98 Misc. 413, 163 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1917).
North Carolina: Parker v. Thomas, 192 N. C. 798, 136 S. E. 118 (1926).
North Dakota: First Nat. Bank v. Flath, 10 N. D. 281, 86 N. W. 867 (1901).
Oklahoma: Farmers' Nat. Bank v. McCall, 25 Okla. 600, 106 Pac. 866 (1910),
26 L. R. A. (n. s.) 217; Smith v. Smith, 80 Okla. 136, 184 Pac. 82 (1919);
Hummell v. Brown, 93 Okla. 256, 221 Pac. 738 (1923).
(Continued on next page)
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The rule apparently stemmed from the decision in Car-
penter v. Longan,72 where the mortgagor gave a negotiable note
secured by a mortgage, which was negotiated to an innocent pur-
chaser for value. The transferee of the note and mortgage
instituted foreclosure proceedings against the mortgagor-maker,
the latter interposing a defense of set-off to the mortgage based
on payments for grain due from the mortgagee to the mortgagor.
The foreclosure was permitted notwithstanding the defense. The
court stated that the mortgage followed the note and partook of
the negotiable character thereof; thus the defense was not allowed
against the mortgage. However, the court also stated that, since
the holder of the negotiable note and the mortgage could recover
against the mortgagor as maker in an action on the note, and
could in turn satisfy the judgment from the mortgaged property,
the holder could foreclose the mortgage to prevent a multiplicity
of suits.
An analysis of this case, which is illustrative of today's prac-
tice of selling mortgages in the secondary market, as well as an
examination of many cases decided under the so-called majority
rule, will disclose that on the same or similar facts the same result
(Continued from preceding page)
Oregon: Bamberger v. Geiser, 24 Ore. 203, 33 Pac. 609 (1893); Starvaggi v.
Ludden, 116 Ore. 119, 240 Pac. 432 (1925).
Rhode Island: Emery v. Mariano, 43 R. 1. 376, 113 Atl. 3 (1921).
South Carolina: Dearman v. Trimmier, 26 S. C. 506, 2 S. E. 501 (1886);
Patterson v. Rabb, 38 S. C. 138, 17 S. E. 463 (1893), 19 L. R. A. 831; Talbert
v. Talbert, 97 S. C. 136, 81 S. E. 644 (1914).
South Dakota: Gold Bros. Secur. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 47 S. D. 31, 195
N. W. 830 (1923); Barbour v. Finke, 47 S. D. 644, 201 N. W. 711, 40 A. L. R.
829 (1925).
Tennessee: Milan Mill. & Mfg. Co. v. Gorten, 93 Tenn. 590, 27 S. W. 971
(1894), 26 L. R. A. 135, 4 Inter. Com. R. 851; Nashville Trust Co. v'.
Smythe, 94 Tenn. 513, 29 S. W. 903 (1895) 27 L. R. A. 663, 45 Am. St. Rep.
748.
Texas: West v. First Baptist Church, 123 Tex. 388, 71 S. W. 2d 1090 (1934);
Van Burkleo v. Southwestern Mfg. Co., 39 S. W. 1085 (Tex. Civ. App.
1896); Thomason v. Flippen-Prather Realty Co., 93 S. W. 2d 799 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936).
Virginia: Williams v. Gifford, 139 Va. 779, 124 S. E. 403 (1924).
Washington: Spencer v. Alki Point Transp. Co., 53 Wash. 77, 101 Pac. 509
(1909), 132 Am. St. Rep. 1058; American Say. Bank & T. Co. v. Helgesen,
64 Wash. 54, 116 Pac. 837 (1912), Ann. Cas. 1913A 390, affd. on rehear., 67
Wash. 572, 122 Pac. 26 (1912), Ann. Cas. 1913A 396; Kiley v. Bugge, 165
Wash. 677, 5 P. 2d 1038 (1933).
West Virginia: Tucker County Bank v. Phares, 86 W. Va. 64, 103 S. E. 349
(1920); Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Co., 97 W. Va. 83, 124 S. E.
591 (1924).
Wisconsin: Franke v. Neisler, 97 Wis. 364, 72 N. W. 887 (1897); Fred
Miller Brewing Co. v. Manasse, 99 Wis. 99, 74 N. W. 535 (1898), 67 Am. St.
Rep. 854.
72 16 Wall. 271, 21 L. Ed. 313 (U. S. 1873).
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could have been reached under equitable principles without
resort to the "negotiability rule."
Set forth below are but a few of the other principles which
must be considered in connection with the "negotiability of
mortgages rule."
According to most decisions, the holder in due course of a
negotiable note secured by a mortgage cannot, in the absence of
equities specially arising, enforce the mortgage if the transaction
of mortgage was void and not merely voidable.73 If duress is
practiced in obtaining the execution of a mortgage securing a
negotiable note, it is regarded by the court as rendering the
transaction of the mortgage void; such fact, in the absence of
additional circumstances raising a superior equity against the
mortgagor, is available as a defense to the mortgage, even though
the note has been negotiated to a due course holder.7 4
Another modification of the rule is that a purchaser or in-
dorsee of the note secured by a mortgage takes it subject to rights
previously acquired, if all the facts taken together, including
sources of information and such circumstances which should
provoke inquiry, show that to allow the transferee the status of
a due course holder would not be equitable.75
For purposes of comparison, the minority doctrine followed
in several jurisdictions -' is that, even though a mortgage secures
a negotiable note, the former is simply a chose in action, that none
of the negotiability of the note is imputed to the mortgage, and
73 Parker v. Thomas, supra note 71 (N. C.); First Nat. Bank v. Bryan, 62
Iowa 42, 17 N. W. 165 (1883); Berry v. Berry, supra note 71 (Kan.).
74 First Nat. Bank v. Bryan, supra note 73; Berry v. Berry, supra note 71
(Kan.); cf., Mack v. Prang, 104 Wis. 1, 79 N. W. 770 (1899), 45 L. R. A.
407, 76 Am. St. Rep. 848.
75 Murphy v. Barnard, supra note 69.
76 Illinois: Shippen v. Whittier, 117 Ill. 282, 7 N. E. 642 (1886); Barrett v.
Hinckley, 124 111. 32, 14 N. E. 863 (1888), 7 Am. St. Rep. 331; Hirsh v.
Arnold, 318 Ill. 28, 148 N. E. 882 (1925).
Louisiana: Schmidt v. Frey, 8 Rob. 435 (1844); Gardner v. Maxwell, 27 La.
Ann. 561 (1875). Minority in that negotiable theory not followed but ordi-
narily due course holder protected from defenses between original parties.
Minnesota: Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 176, Gil. 120 (1862); Hostetter
v. Alexander, 22 Minn. 559 (1876); Blumenthal v. Jassoy, 29 Minn. 177, 12
N. W. 517 (1882).
New Jersey: Woodruff v. Morristown Inst. for Sav., 34 N. J. Eq. 174 (rule
intimated) (1881). But in Magie v. Reynolds, 51 N. J. Eq. 113, 26 Atl. 150
(1893), support was given to the rule excluding defenses.
Ohio: Baily v. Smith, 14 Ohio St. 396, 84 Am. Dec. 385 (1863); Ranney v.
Hardy, 43 Ohio St. 157, 1 N. E. 523 (1885); Osborn v. McClelland, 43 Ohio
St. 284, 1 N. E. 644 (1885); Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lynde, 55
Ohio St. 23, 44 N. E. 596 (1896) (affd. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
Long Island Loan & T. Co., 172 U. S. 493, 43 L. Ed. 528, 19 Sup. Ct. 238, 12
Ohio F. Dec. 333 (1899); First Nat. Bank v. Brotherton, 78 Ohio St. 162,
84 N. E. 794 (1908); Ashland Bldg. & L. Co. v. Kerman, 23 Ohio App. 127,
155 N. E. 245 (1926) (recognizes majority rule).
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that it is subject in the hands of a holder in due course to all the
equities and defenses to which it was subject in the hands of the
mortgagee-payee.
Summary
As asserted earlier in this article, one of our country's
greatest needs is an ample supply of risk capital to invest in real
estate mortgages. The remote lender, typified by life insurance
companies and pension funds, can meet this need. Generally,
however, they cannot be at the point of closing, and thus assure
themselves that their mortgage investment is free of the defense
of usury.
Although a transferee lender can avail himself of several
defenses noted above, even these have serious limitations. In the
case of a loan originated by a building and loan association, the
mortgage purchaser must satisfy himself that the operational
statutes have been strictly complied with, particularly with
respect to the question of premium, which today has come to be
more popularly known as points. The denial of the defense of
usury to corporations is, of course, very effective as it relates to
corporate borrowers. Even though these statutes are of great
value in the financing of commercial structures, they do not
afford any significant protection to the investor in residential
mortgages. The special F. H. A. statute adopted in some states
appears to afford a measure of protection, although there does
not seem to have been any court test of its use as a defense, as
yet.
The NIL negotiable mortgage theory also offers some pro-
tection to the investor, but, as shown above, it is neither universal
nor clear-cut in the protection afforded. Further, the introduction
of the Uniform Commercial Code in several of the states bodes
fair to further confuse an already confused area of law.77
It is submitted that the time has come for a change in our
usury laws as they relate to residential housing. It can be seen
that no great hardship has been suffered by corporate borrowers
who have lost such a defense. It may be argued that they are, on
the whole, better informed than other borrowers; however, I
would suggest that the average borrower who has had the acumen
to accumulate the equity money for a conventional mortgage loan
likewise has the capacity to evaluate his loan contract without the
benefit of a paternalistic statute. As to minimum down payment
loans insured by the federal government, both the V. A. and
the F. H. A. have comprehensive bodies of regulations to protect
77 Beggan and Kaelin, Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper
Transactions Between Code and Non-Code States: A Problem of Ap-
plicable Law, 34 Notre Dame Law 209 (1959); DeMartin, Negotiable Instru-
ments-Burden of Proof on a Holder in Due Course, Comparison of Uni-
form Commercial Code with the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, 10
Mercer L. R. 211 (1958).
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the borrower, and both agencies examine their loan transactions
very thoroughly.
Neither can it be argued that a modification of the usury laws
would be unduly in derogation of the common law, since the
entire body of usury regulation is strictly statutory and any
modification thereof would be restorative of the common law.
The parties to a real estate loan transaction should have the
freedom to contract as regards usury and real estate mortgages.
Rather than depend on tenuous protective principles, with their
varying weaknesses, I suggest the adoption of a uniform statute
in the several states to achieve the freedom urged. A single stat-
ute would be superior to the amendment of the Negotiable In-
struments Law or the inclusion in the proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, since it has been shown that the former
already leads to confusion and the complete state-by-state adop-
tion of the latter is probably a long way off. Such a statute could
probably be most effectively promulgated by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol10/iss2/15
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